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Networks Working Group: Diego Cerdeiro

When Oct 31, 2013
from 03:00 PM to 05:00 PM
Where Marshall Room
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Presenter: Diego Cerdeiro

Paper: Cerdeiro, Dziubinski, Goyal, Individual Security and Network Design

Individuals derive benefits from their connections, but these may, at the same time, transmit external threats. Individuals therefore invest in security to protect themselves. What are the network architectures that maximize collective welfare?
We propose a model to explore the tension between connectivity and exposure to the threat of an intelligent adversary when security choices are decentralized.
Our first finding is that faced with an intelligent adversary who seeks to minimize network value, both over-investment and under-investment in security are possible. Social welfare may be maximized in sparse connected networks when under-investment pressures are present, and fragmented networks when over-investment pressures prevail.
Our second finding is that faced with a random attack, the over-investment problem is no longer present but under-investment is a challenge. This under-investment is best addressed by creating dense connected networks that increase exposure of individuals.