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The Cambridge-INET Institute - continuing as the Janeway Institute

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Elliott, M., Galeotti, A., Koh, A., Li, W.

Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces

JIWP Number: 2304

Abstract: There are many markets that are networked in these sense that not all consumers have access to (or are aware of) all products, while, at the same time, firms have some information about consumers and can distinguish some consumers from some others (for example, in online markets through cookies). With unit demand and price-setting firms we give a complete characterization of all welfare outcomes achievable in equilibrium (for arbitrary buyer-seller networks and arbitrary information structures), as well as the designs (networks and information structures) which implement them.

Author links: Matthew Elliott  

PDF: jiwp2304.pdf

Open Access Link: 10.17863/CAM.99016

Theme: networks