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Dziubiński, M., Goyal, S., Zhou, J.

Interconnected Conflict

JIWP Number: 2403

Abstract: We study a model of conflict with multiple battlefields and the possibility of investments spillovers between the battlefields. Results of conflicts at the individual battlefields are determined by the Tullock contest success function based on efforts assigned to a battlefield as well as efforts spilling over from the neighbouring battlefields. We characterize Nash equilibria of this model and uncover a network invariance result: equilibrium payoffs, equilibrium total expenditure, and equilibrium probabilities of winning individual battlefields are independent of the network of spillovers. We show that the network invariance holds for any contest success function that is homogeneous of degree zero and has the no-tie property. We define a network index that characterizes equilibrium efforts assignments of the players. We show that the index satisfies neighbourhood inclusion and can, therefore, be considered a network centrality.

Keywords: Conflict, Investments, Models, Networks

Author links: Sanjeev Goyal  

PDF: jiwp2403.pdf

Open Access Link: 10.17863/CAM.107471

Theme: networks