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Elliott, M. and Nava, F.

Decentralized Bargaining in Matching Markets: Efficient Stationary Equilibria and the Core

Theoretical Econoimcs

Vol. 14 pp. 211–251 (2019)

Abstract: This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched to whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reach agreement they exit the market. Alternative possible matches affect agents' bargaining positions. We ask when do such markets clear efficiently and find that inefficiencies - mismatch and delay - often feature. Mismatch occurs whenever an agent's bargaining position is at risk of deteriorating. Delay occurs whenever agents expect their bargaining position to improve. Delay can be extensive and structured with vertically differentiated markets endogenously clearing from the top down.

Keywords: Bargaining, matching markets, mismatch, delay, search

JEL Codes: C78, L14

Author links: Matthew Elliott  

Publisher's Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2416



Cambridge-INET Working Paper Version of Paper: Decentralized Bargaining in Matching Markets: Efficient Stationary Equilibria and the Core, Elliott, M. and Nava, F., (2017)