Cambridge-INET Working Papers - Abstracts | The Cambridge-INET Institute

Interaction, Protection and Epidemics

WP Number: 1409

Abstract: Individuals respond to the risk of infectious diseases by restricting interaction and by investing in protection. We develop a model that examines the trade-off between these two actions and the consequences for disease prevalence. There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to interact more relative to those who do not invest in protection. Changes in the contagiousness of the disease have nonmonotonic effects: as a result interaction initially falls and then rises, while disease prevalence too may initial increase and then decline. We then consider a society with two communities that differ in their returns from interaction - High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protection and interaction and a lower rate of infection. Integration amplifies these differences.

Keywords: Epidemics, Social interaction, Vaccination

JEL Codes: I12 D85